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THE DANDY AND THE FOGY: THACKERAY AND
THE AESTHETICS/ETHICS
OF THE
LITERARY PRAGMATIST
BY ROBERT P. FLETCHER
I. INTRODUCTION

of
As he recountsBeckySharp'srisetorespectability,
thenarrator
to redescribe"our" reVanityFair pauses, as he does frequently,
lationto his fairheroine:
It is all vanity
tobe sure:butwhowillnotowntolikinga little
ofit?I shouldliketoknowwhatwell-constituted
mind,merely
but
becauseitis transitory,
dislikesroastbeef?Thatis a vanity;
ofit
mayeverymanwhoreadsthis,havea wholesome
portion
through
life,I beg: ay,thoughmyreaderswerefivehundred
andfallto,witha goodhearty
thousand.
Sitdown,gentlemen,
thehorseradish
as youlike
appetite;thefat,thelean,thegravy,
it-don'tspareit.Another
glassofwine,Jones,
myboy-a little
bitoftheSundayside.Yes,letus eatourfillofthevainthing,
and be thankful
Andlet us makethebestofBecky's
therefor.
aristocratic
thesetoo,likeall othermorpleasureslikewise-for
taldelights,
werebuttransitory.'
Thackeraycreatesin thispassage a perspectivethattakesaway as
it gives a probationary
sympathy
to Becky'sambition,and to a possible reader'sresponseto it.Our desirefortheephemeralproducts
of existenceis firstvalidated; we shouldn'tfeel guiltyforliking
roastbeef. Thackeray'sfeel forthe transitory
natureofexperience
here yields not an abstemiousdespair,but an unapologeticrelish
forour "vain things.""Well-constituted
minds"give due attention
tothehereand now.Yetthechummyexhortation
is undercutbyhis
admissionin the last sentencethatbothourand Becky'spleasures
as if-even thoughhe admitsthe persuasive
are "but transitory,"
forceof roastbeef-he would posit somethingless transitory
than
temporalexistence.Thus he has his roastbeef and eats it too; he
celebratesBecky'sactionswhilequalifying(bytemporalizing)
their
success. This wrysympathyis tame, however,comparedto the
ironyin the advice thatwe should "make the best ofBecky'saristocraticpleasures," forhere the narratorcounsels us to consume
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"Becky Sharp" as we do roastbeef. The novel itselfis offeredas just
one more of those vain things which are transitory,and by implication our desire formore than a transitoryperformanceis a vanity
in itself.The perspective has suddenly doubled, and we get caught
in the middle, implicated by our enjoyment of Becky when we
thoughtour voyeurism was harmless reading.
A couple of questions of interestforhow we read Thackeray (and
other literature) are involved in this short intrusion: how are the
author's fascinationwith and valuing of temporal existence and his
positing of somethingtranscendentto it related? And of what good
is a narrative so infused with irony? These questions of value (of
experience and of literature)fora "well-constitutedmind" hinge on
Thackeray's concept of vanity,thatword thatpervades virtuallyall
of his work. Depending on context,almost anythingand everything
presented in a Thackerayan novel is vain (or valueless): material
products, words, beliefs, life, love. The last of these is sometimes
raised into a transcendent value, but at the end of his (currently)
most valued work,Vanity Fair, even it is qualified, its contingency
made apparent in the ironic dampening of Dobbin's ardor
forAmelia.
And yet, for a novelist troubled by the emptiness of existence,
Thackeray writes books abounding in its materials: turtlesoup and
good claret, polished boots and shiny buttons, well-turned calves
and bare arms fill his novels with the upper-middle class culture of
his day. Vain can also mean conceited, or puffed up (certainlyJos
Sedley personifies this definition),and Thackeray is fascinated by
those who are particularly full of themselves and of life. Philip
Firmin, the hero of his last complete novel, is one of Thackeray's
most potent swaggerers. If at his most serious, Thackeray despairs
over the futilityof human endeavor, he just as oftencelebrates the
vitality of those who, like Becky Sharp, chase after "pleasures."
Few novelists are more conscious than Thackeray of how both culture and literatureare forever being reconstituted through redescriptions-the existing sign is found to be empty and is remade
into something to be proud of, at least temporarily.And no Victorian novelist is more conscious of his own part in this process. His
status as ironist and his foothold in the canon derive fromhis recognition of the paradox that is the subject of Barbara Herrnstein
Smith's recent book: when we invest somethingwith meaning and/
or value, the contingencyof thatinvestmentsubjects it to eventual
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devaluation-whether it be the fashions we wear, the books we
write and read, or the lives we live.2
If his consciousness of the fragilityof value doesn't lead him to
abandon the thrillsof the fair,it does, however, occasionally open
him to utopian yearnings for something not subject to change.
Thackeray's sentimenttoday loses him more readers than his irony,
but ratherthan coming froma softhead (a common accusation from
unappreciative critics),it arises out of his intellectual realization of
the impermanence of life, coupled with an appreciation of the distinctiveness of each life.3Richard Rortyreads a Philip Larkin poem
as an expression of the human need to find something in life both
idiosyncratic and universal-of the desire to be both poet and
philosopher.4 Thackeray communicates this same drive to create
both the unique-whether as dandy or novelist-and the representative. His irony, which undercuts every performance (even his
own), and his sentiment,which treasures the human urge to perform,are both elements of a temperamentwhich I designate, after
Rorty,as that belonging to the protopragmatist.5Thackeray values
human effortto act or to know or to believe, while he questions the
value of individual acts, knowledge, and beliefs. As a consequence
of this pragmatictemperament,Thackerayan narrativesare a blend
of inquiry and provisional assertion, heuristic in their project to
reassess the significance of human action. This disposition of mind
lies behind the theme of vanity and influences Thackeray's concepts of fiction,narrative,and the ethical functionof literature.
II. THACKERAY AS AN IRONIST

One of the easiest ways into Thackeray's literarypragmatismis
throughirony,doubtless a critical path itself tangled by numerous
remappings. When seen as a literarytool, it can be appropriated by
writerswith radically differentphilosophies. William Empson's socalled single ironymerelyrequires the use of an incongruityin one
standpoint to bolster another that the writerfinds more attractive.
The attempt to provide an example of this use of irony,however,
mightbe tricky,as we would quite easily finda point of dispute in
whetherthe writerreally endorses the point ofview leftintact.This
problem of where irony stops once it startsbrings us to Empson's
double irony,labeled variously by othersas Romantic irony,unstable irony,dialectic, or reflexivity.6
Here, ratherthan one viewpoint
being permanentlyadopted in place of an earlier or more conven-
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tional one, the writerretreatsfromeach position, only conditionally
accepting any view as a restingpoint. Every view is qualified, and
every use of language is rhetoricallymarked as self-conscious.
In all such theories, irony includes a self-consciousness about
one's own language. When the thoroughgoingironistsees a particular use of language as not necessary but only possible, sees it is as
subject to troping (through parody, for instance) as human life is
itself to mutability,the ironistcan bring an awareness of this shift
in value to his or her own life. According to Rorty,the realization
that contingency underwrites human culture allows the ironist to
attempthis or her own self-creationthroughlanguage. The ironist
redescribes self and the world, and in so doing, creates a distinctive
identity,the differencefromall other"I's," the loss of which, Rorty
claims, is what we fear when we contemplate death (CIS, 23). But
the ironistalso realizes the contingencyof thatproud act of invention, and knowing it subject to change, holds it tentatively,until
another act of redescribing makes it obsolete. Rorty'sirony,then, is
more philosophy than technique, or rather,the technique and philosophy are often found together.This description fitsThackeray
both as criticand practicingnovelist; coincident with his brilliance
as literaryparodist and ironist is a pragmatism that reenacts the
conflictingdesires to be unique and universal, of the moment and
lasting.
Drawn fromhis readings of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein,
Freud, William James, Donald Davidson, and others, Rorty's description of the ironist is of one who conducts inquiry into previously held notions of reality,and of self and others,throughredescription.How we are like and unlike othersis the ironist'sconstant
object of discovery and reassessment. This figureitselfseems to be
a good model for understanding Thackeray's fascination with his
culture's moralityand modes of existence. In The Book of Snobs,
Thackeray embodies the paradox ofthe individual seeking distance
froma language (in this case, thatof snobbery) to a point less open
to questioning, and in the end reproducing the same language:
It is a greatmistaketojudge ofSnobslightly,
and thinktheyexist
among the lower classes merely.An immensepercentageof
Snobs,I believe, is to be foundin everyrankofthismortallife.
You mustnotjudge hastilyorvulgarlyofSnobs: to do so shows
thatyou are yourselfa Snob. I myselfhave been takenforone.
(Works,6:305)
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In fact,snobbery forThackeray is related to irony in an important
way. Both the ironist and the snob distance themselves fromthe
language of the other; but snobs take theirposition (and its accompanying language) as superior to that of the other, as somehow
stable or permanentlyvaluable (or more "realistic"), while ironists
see their alternativelife or language as just one more contingency.
We mightsay snobs are ironistsunaware thatthey are being ironic
about one verymuch like themselves. And the slylyplaced point of
dispute in the quotation above is just how aware Mr. Snob is.
Thackeray's willingness to explore and question "final
vocabularies" (Rorty,CIS, 73)-those of his culture as well as his
own-needs itself to be explored anew. I find evidence for this
brand of philosophical irony (which pragmatistswould argue enlists under its banner such diverse figures as Emerson and
Nietzsche, Wordsworth and Derrida) in Thackeray's novels and
journalism.7 Rorty'sstatementthat "since there is nothing beyond
vocabularies which serves as a criterionof choice between them,
criticism is a matterof looking on this picture and on that, not of
comparing both pictures with the original" (CIS, 80) sounds like
the basis forThackeray's evaluative art criticism,in which he unabashedly favorsone picture over another, not because it captures
an ideal or a truth,but because the clothes on the figuressuit him
and his culture better.8On the other hand, in his travel books he
provides a perspective on his own culture as well as the foreign
one; the Fat Contributoris firstan advocate forEnglish ways but
then the satiristof English tourists'habits-seemingly embodying,
so to speak, Rorty'sclaim that"nothing can serve as a criticismof a
person save another person, or of a culture save an alternative culture-for persons and cultures are, forus, incarnated vocabularies"
(CIS, 80).9 Thackeray embraces the relation between subjective
voice speaking and the meaning found in the object, unlike-as
Smith points out-critics in the early and mid-twentiethcentury
(CV, 17-29). While the snob, the ironist, and the sentimentalist
seem to usurp each other's position in Thackeray's mind, their vocabularies finally play against one another to remind him and us
that they are each only a vocabulary.
Of course snobs and ironistslive in Vanity Fair. Thackeray's concept of vanity has its place in a philosophical tradition stretching
fromthe utilitariansto the pragmatismformulatedby Charles Sanders Peirce at the end of the nineteenth centuryand developed in
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the twentiethby William James,JohnDewey, and now Rorty.Common to all are both the process by which old truthsare overturned
in favorof new ones and the attitudeof inquiry engendered by that
process. Thackeray's inquiries take the formoffictionsinterspersed
with intrusive self-assessments which posit possible relations between the fiction and the reader's own language, thus ironically
exposing the latteras one description. An examination of Thackeray's irony,therefore,leads us to his concept of fictionand his concern with its uses.
III. EXPLORING, EXPOSING, AND EXPLOITING

THE POWER

OF FICTION

Modern philosophers and literarytheoristsengage the problem
of truthand fiction(as well as the related one of realityand literature) on a theoretical level. Thackeray, although not articulating
theirformulations,did anticipate in his narrativesand criticismthe
concerns of those who ponder the connections between fictionand
the world, and among fiction,our selves, and the values we define.
In On the Margins of Discourse, Smith divides language use into
fictivediscourse and naturaldiscourse in orderto get at the former's
distinctive features.'0 Unlike speech-act theoristJohn Searle, who
opposes "real world talk" to "parasitic discourse" by designating
nonfictionaluses of language as "natural," she does not imply that
nonfictionaluses of language are of more value." Fictive discourse
is no more artificialforSmith than other discourse; its ontological
status is, if not the same, just as secure. But there is something
distinctiveabout it. She cites children's abilityat an early age to tell
(and understand as fictions)imaginative stories,as well as Gregory
Bateson's claim forthe significance of the chimpanzee's ability to
distinguish real aggression fromfake aggression (or play).'2
The way we respond to utterances (or texts) depends to a great
extent on our classifications of them, based upon conventional
markers.As Robert Newsom points out in his book A Likely Story,
the deeply engrossed viewer of a scary movie has classified the
experience of seeing a film as one of watching a fiction; this classificationmakes available a second frameof reference which forestalls the necessity of the viewer gettingup and running out of the
theater when the monster on the screen stalks as if towards the
audience.'3 Yet, as Woody Allen's The Purple Rose of Cairo so
whimsically shows, people nonetheless can and do blur the
"margin" between fictive text and real discourse. Smith points to
388
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the effectiveness of modern advertising and the "sentimental"
value of prefabricatedgreeting card verse to reveal how we sometimes use and interpretfictive utterances as "natural" (OMD, 5560). The conventions which allow us to interpretsomething as fiction are exploited in other nonfictivecontexts. We learn fromour
lifelong experience with language when the conventions thatcharacterize fictive discourse apply and when they don't, but there is
always the potential forconfusion,purposeful or otherwise.
Thackeray as novelist and critic is fascinated by the problem of
fiction,what constitutes it and how we use it. His parodies-both
"Novels by Eminent Hands" and the many snippets in the novels,
such as the beginning of the "Vauxhall" chapter of Vanity Fairevidence his sensitivityto how we use language to formour understanding of experiences. As Bateson argues that different
"maps" can be applied to the same "territory"and therebyconstitute differentkinds of knowledge, so Thackeray shows that different "plots" (which includes stylisticvariation)can be applied to the
same "story" and thereby yield differentfictions."4He plays such
stylized "language games" against one another, exaggerating the
markers of Lever's or Disraeli's distinctive vocabularies, for instance, so as to eliminate the representationalbond to reality each
claims to possess. The conventions of such romances have forhim
the status of "prefabricated discourse," to use Smith's term; they
are overused tools which-though they can stand out when exaggerated in parody-can still be effectivewhen used well. Thackeray's strenuous attacks on the Newgate Novel proceed froman ambivalence about the ways in which Bulwer and others (Thackeray
even classified Dickens among them) could adapt prefabricated
formsof fiction (romance), complete with markers signaling they
were meant to be interpretedas fiction,to subjects (crimes) commonly described in a rhetoricconventionally taken to be "natural
discourse" and thereby blur the margins between the two. He objected to Bulwer and company, therefore,not only on account ofthe
unnaturalness of describing criminals as heroes, but because he
was acutely aware of the potential unnaturalness of all discourse.
No vocabulary is more originallyattached to realitythan any other;
each is merely a construct,a compelling fictionimposed by humans
and competing with others quite as capable of describing a given
realityif used well and read as natural. As Smith argues, there are
no hard and fastrules forwhen and when not to read something as
fiction,and we occasionally cross over fromdoing the one to the
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other without being aware of the switch (OMD, 41-75). In Catherine, his own attempt to expose the fictionalityof Newgate fictions,Thackeray encountered the difficultyof employing a conventional discourse that is marked as fictional without finding it as
persuasive as reality. He began with parody, but (like Fielding in
Joseph Andrews) found it difficultto carryout the exercise to novel
length withoutcreatinga coherent orchestrationof language which
he found convincing himself.Thackeray appropriated the narrative
formulabut found his heroine more than formulaic:
Your letterwithcomplimentshas just come to hand; it is very
ingeniousin youto findsuchbeautiesin Catherinewhichwas a
mistakeall through-itwas notmade disgustingenoughthatis
the fact,and thetriumphofit would have been to makereaders
so horribly
horrified
as to cause themto give up or ratherthrow
up thebook and all ofit's [sic] kind,whereasyou see theauthor
had a sneakingkindnessforhis heroine,and did notlike tomake
her utterlyworthless.'5
Two years later Thackeray returnedto this topic of how fictional
convention can become part of our natural discourse. Barry Lyndon, unlike Catherine and his own literary ancestor Fielding's
JonathanWild, tells his own story.Despite his insistence on plain
speaking, he frequently lapses into romance, sometimes unwittingly, sometimes quite consciously, as when he reflects on his
challenge forhis cousin's hand:
"I'll have his blood,or he shall have mine;and thisribandshall
be founddyedin it.Yes! and ifI killhim,I'll pin iton hisbreast,
and thenshe maygo takeback hertoken."This I said because I
was verymuchexcitedat the time,and because I had notread
mynovelsand romanticplaysfornothing.'6
Although Barry can detect in retrospect the artificialityof his
younger self's language, at other times he adopts a heroic idiom
withoutbeing aware of its rhetoricalnature, as, forinstance, when
he describes himself as a romanticgambler-gentleman:
Is this not somethinglike boldness? does this professionnot
require skill, and perseverance,and bravery?Four crowned
heads looked on at the game,and an imperialprincess,when I
turnedup theace ofheartsand made Paroli,burstintotears.No
manon theEuropeanContinentheld a higherpositionthanRedmondBarrythen;and when the Duke ofCourlandlost,he was
pleased to saythatwe had won nobly:and so we had,and spent
noblywhatwe won. (BL, 130)
390
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We enjoy the braggadocio at this point; we simultaneously laugh at
Barryand participate in this fictional (in a double sense-perhaps
"fictive fictional"?) life. Only later, when he terrorizesLady Lyndon into marryinghim, are we made aware of the consequences
that Barry's fictionsabout himself have forothers,and of how our
crediting those stories (as readers of Barry Lyndon) somehow implicates us in their effectiveness.When he enters Lady Lyndon's
world as her suitor, Barryposes as the gothic villain-"Terror, be
sure of that," he tells us, "is not a bad ingredient of love" (218)and succeeds in instilling a fear and fascination in his object.
this initial contactbecomes a "story
Through Barry'stireless efforts,
of her ladyship's passionate attachmentforme," and our PR wizard
is not slow "in profitingby these rumours" (228). He continues his
progress:
Every one thoughtI was well with the widowed countess,
thoughno one could show thatI said so. But thereis a way of
provinga thingeven while youcontradict
it,and I used to laugh
and joke so a proposthatall men began to wish me joy of my
greatfortune,
and lookup to me as theaffiancedhusbandofthe
greatestheiressin the kingdom.The paperstookup the matter.
(228)
Thackeray makes his scoundrel a masterat manipulating the public
voice of gossip, because the novelist understands how much of
personal belief is made up of such culturally shared fictions. If
Barrycan convince the world of this "love story"he can persuade
Lady Lyndon as well that"Fate workswith agents, greatand small;
and by means over which they have no controlthe destinies of men
and women are accomplished" (231). She does eventually succumb
to Barry's artfullyconstructed"fate" and marries him. Throughout
the novel, "fate," "luck," and "fortune" serve the failed Barry's
own purposes as comfortingfictionsto explain away his imprisoned
end. The novel is largelyabout belief in fictions:Barry'sown, Lady
Lyndon's, and most importantlythe reader's belief in Barry Lyndon. Thackeray deliberatelyjuggles the moments when we have to
credit some of what Barry says with those when we know he is
lying, and even adds in a third level of "editor" complete with
interpretivetastes for"poetical justice [which] overtakes the daring
and selfish hero" (234), all to show us the temptationwe have when
reading to forgetthe fictionalityof the discourse, or of such things
as "poetical justice." The novel itselfsucceeds in "proving a thing
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credit
even while [it] contradictis]it" by gettingus to reflexively
(as a fiction)a fictionalliar's life.
Thackerayfocusesso muchofhis attentionon BarryLyndonand
otherscoundrelsbecause oftheirabilityto manipulatetheconvenin an amusing(albeitinsidtionsgoverningdiscursivetransactions
notonlyviolatesthe"basic
is
he
who
liar
ious) way.The dangerous
are implied
assumptionofthelinguisticmarketplace"thatreferents
with
"in
accord
to
be
inferred
and
are
event
by a verbalor textual
but
keeps
100),
OMD,
conventions"
(Smith,
and
rules
the relevant
thatevent coherentand, above all, interestingas well. In other
words he is the potentialfictionwriter.If BarryLyndon fails at
sustaininga coherentnarrative(and fromthe firstsentenceofthe
novel Thackeraymakesa pointofprovidingplentyofroomforinBarry'sown),he succeedsinmakthatcontradict
inferences
terpretive
character.
in makinghimselfan interesting
inghis storyinteresting,
Thackerayand otherwriterswho employsuch unreliablenarratorsunderstandand exploitthe rules of a language game which
dictatethat
notonly
forthelistener,
utterance
a natural
[ortext]constitutes,
to
an obligation,
butultimately
and provocation,
an invitation
as distinWhenwe "listen"tosomeone,
tothespeaker.
respond
whathe says-in
oroverhearing
merelynoticing
guishedfrom
ourselvesas his audience-we
otherwords,whenwe identify
agreeto makeourselvesavailableto thatspeakeras
implicitly
We agreenotonlytohearbutto
ofhisinterests.
theinstrument
also,
andcommands-and
excuses,questions,
heedhispromises,
we
Mostsimply,
butmostsignificantly,
ofcourse,hisassertions.
themotives
whathe means,thatis,toinfer
agreetounderstand
OMD,
(Smith,
thatoccasionedhisutterance.
andcircumstances
101-2)
we agree,at leastinitially,toaccept
Whenwe "listen"toa narrative
whatthe narrator
presentsto us as true,untilwe detecta violation
of the good faithneeded to play the game. Even thenwe have to
creditsome ofwhatwe are told-or stopplayingthegamewiththis
speaker(orwriter),orplayourown game-as is oftenthecase with
the speaker-less(presence-less)text.What happens, Thackeray
seems to be askingin BarryLyndon,when we knowthe rules are
withoutbeing suspended(Barryclaimsto be an
beingtransgressed
nota fictionwriter),and we findthe discourseinautobiographer
terestingnonetheless?Are we thenbelievinga fictionto be true?
Can we always,while we are enjoyingourselveswiththe story,
392
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keep the fictiveand natural utterances clearly distinguished? And
what are the consequences of such a play with the conventions of
discourse? Thackeray's project is to educate his readers in their
habits of reading and of belief. Probabilityand credulityare always
at issue forThackeray, not only in his criticismof others,but in his
own novels as well. He seems-as a novelist-to be more interested
in how we read and believe than in whether particular beliefs are
true. His protopragmatismevidences itself in this preoccupation
with how we know and its consequences forhow we live.
IV. SKEPTICISM

AND BELIEF;

VANITY AND VALUE

The interestin fiction's sway with readers that I have been tracing in the last section is related to Thackeray's own struggleswith
skepticism and belief. His theological doubts instill an epistemological uncertainty,or vice versa. Taken together these conditions both make possible the fictionshe writes and help determine
his eventual difficultywith writingfictionat all.
Gordon Ray has documented Thackeray's recurring struggles
with skepticism, firstunder the influence of Edward Fitzgerald,
and later as he took in the intellectual currentsof mid-century.17
Ray cites extensively chapter 61 of Pendennis, "The Way of the
World," wherein the dialectic between the skeptical, worldly Pen
and the resolute, dutifulGeorge Warringtondoes indeed reflectthe
author's own conflictbetween doubt and certainty.The cynical Pen
argues thatabsolute faithin one's own voice breeds dogmatismand
persecution; he cites historicalexamples to supporthis position. So
farhe is in the right.Even Warringtonand the narratoradmire the
young dandy's tolerance of human imperfectionand rejection of
cant. But Pen uses these realizations to justifyan indifferenceto all
human endeavor and all morality,and this is where he trips up.
Thackeray's will to believe is embodied in the fogy Warrington,
who insists that the struggleitself,"the protest" against the impotence of skepticism,is all. To Pen's "sneering acquiescence in the
world as it is; or if you like so to call it, . . . belief qualified with
scorn in all things extant" (Works, 2:614-15) is opposed Warrington'ssense of duty. In this tension between belief and doubt is
Thackeray's peculiar appreciation of fictionborn, forin the incongruityof this desire to believe with an ironic distance fromformsof
belief we findan importantelement in our understandingof fictive
discourse, the mind's simultaneous use of two framesof reference,
the ability to believe while not believing. Thackeray's tempera-
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ment,exemplified by this coincidence of skepticism and the will to
believe, suits him to his chosen task of uncovering vanity, that
double-sided coin of conceit and emptiness, which shows us how
human culture can be both legal tender and counterfeitat the same
time.
If vanity allows Thackeray to express his skeptic side, it also
permitshim to celebrate the attemptto believe, the attemptto find
value. To be self-consciouslyvain of somethingis to be cognizant of
overvaluing the item even while enjoying it. In this sense of vanity
Thackeray himself recognizes what Smith calls the "contingencies
of value." Although we always want to believe in things, people,
ideas, and words, withoutqualification, we find our understanding
of each depends upon particular contexts and chance events, and
must be kept currentthroughrevision.
Belief, then, becomes forThackeray an ideal that is never fully
realized. His temperament of mind favors habits of inquiry once
again akin to those of pragmatism. He had been tutored at Cambridge by William Whewell, who lectured on connections between
science and moralityand was writinghis History of the Inductive
Sciences while Thackeray attended, and later in life, as a moderate
liberal, he admired science's and society's advances. I believe a
healthy skepticism,which Richard Poirier has deemed a prerequisite to "the deed of writing," finds its expression in Thackeray's
work in the significantrole that discovery and inquiry play in his
novels.'8 His chattynarratorsmay endorse particularvalues (which
we may or may not agree with as we read him now), but they more
importantlyrehearse the act of valuing, because Thackeray sees
how we are capable of changing the nature of thingswe experience
(forourselves) when we redescribe them:
A word of kindnessor acknowledgment,
or a single glance of
approbation,
mighthave changedEsmond'sopinionofthegreat
man; and insteadofa satire,whichhis pen cannothelp writing,
who knowsbut thatthe humblehistorianmighthave takenthe
We havebuttochangethepointofview,
otherside ofpanegyric?
and the greatestactionlooks mean; as we turnthe perspectiveglass,and a giantappearsa pigmy.You maydescribe,but who
can tell whetheryoursightis clear or not, or yourmeans of
information
accurate?(Works,7:222)
Because of this dialogic element in Thackeray's work, I pair as
analogous the concepts of skepticism and vanity, and belief and
value (sentimental or otherwise). When we value something we
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oftenbelieve in it quite fervently(as Thackeray shows in a pathetic
character like Old Osborne). Thackeray's skepticism is best described by the term vanity because the latter hints at the vague
notion of somethingbeyond the contingentwhich instills him with
his sentimental melancholy. Perhaps this frame of mind derives
fromhis remarkable sense of the contingency of things past. In a
"Roundabout" essay on a fragmentby Charlotte Bront&,he speculates about the text (and by implication about aesthetic texts in
general): "If the Has Been, why not the Might Have Been?"
(Works, 12:187). Not only might things have been different,they
and these two, Thack"Might Have Been" represented differently,
eray realizes-through his inquiries into probabilityin narrativecan be very nearly the same.
Once philosophers realize (as Thackeray does) thatparticularvalues are possibilities but not necessities, they begin to downplay
abstractmoral law in favorof individual narratives-the moral function of which depends on such a relativisticethics. Rortyhas described narrative's central role in exploring the value of particular
ethical paradigms-in fact,he calls the historyof intellectual and
moral progress "a historyof increasingly useful metaphors" (CIS,
9). This role is certainlythe one Thackeray saw good fictionalnarratives playing in his own society. However, fictionswhich either
attempt to hide their fictionality or propose too easily a
"transcendent" or "romantic" truthcome under his severest scrutiny. His own voice, on the other hand, is always clearly that of an
individual relating the events of his experience: that is, always
clearly in a rhetorical situation complete with all the hazards of
argumentand deception. Thackeray's narrativesdepend heavily on
a discernible scaffoldof hypothesis and inference fortheir persuasiveness, and their goal is discovery of new ways of talking about
reality,and new descriptions of it that encompass older ones. The
ironist specializes in redescribing reality in partially neologistic
jargon (Rorty, CIS, 78); Thackeray's attempts to redefine such
thingsas snobbery,worldly success, and the gentleman are signs of
his interest in using narrativeas heuristic.'9 He realizes there are
no values which are not contingentand no vocabularies which are
final. Perhaps the most interestingresult, for his readers, of his
doubts and desire to believe is the effecthis uncertaintyhas on the
formof his novels. Uncertain of himself as well as others, Thackeray writes narrative which involves a great deal of speculation,
playful and serious at once.
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V. THACKERAYAN NARRATIVE AS COGNITIVE

PLAY

Reading Thackeray's novels as representations of our need to
reassess and revise cognitive activityand its accompanying moral
judgements allows us to appreciate certain distinctive features of
Thackeray's art,while not denying that many of his individual assessments and judgements are not ours. Thackeray can still make us
aware of the "independent charms of epistemic activity" (Smith,
OMD, 117). In life we are mainly concerned with cognitive ends
which are rewarded by the everyday world. In art we are made
aware of cognitive activities-how we know what we know-and
Thackeray's narratives reward readers for taking their cues to examine how theyuse culturaland narrativeconventions to formtheir
worlds. On the other hand, Thackeray's unrevised racial views as,
forinstance, in the characterofWoolcomb in Philip, are offensiveto
us (and undoubtedly have lost him many readers). His individual
assessments stand up less well than his interest in assessing. But
even in that novel, as Alexander Welsh has argued (Welsh, Thackeray), we can find valuable Thackeray's use of fictionforheuristic
purposes.
I thinkit is worthpursuing the suggestion Welsh has made that
Thackerayan narrativeis distinctiveforits predominantlyspeculative tenor. According to Rorty,narrativeis one of the pragmatist's
primarytools forhelping us see and revise our intellectual habits
(CIS, vxi). Fictional narrative helps us invent new vocabularies,
since-as we have seen-its places of intersectionwith our present
vocabulary help loosen the latter's hold on our knowledge of the
world. Smith sees fictional narratives as examples of "cognitive
play," places where we test out new descriptions of the world and
of our place in it with relatively few consequences (when, that is,
we can clearly keep distinguished the "margins"). These aesthetic
toys and ethical tools allow us to grasp the "structuralrelations"
(Smith, OMD, 117) of our world and modify them, and perhaps
consequently modifythe world outside us. In order to so work and
allow us to learn, cognitive activitymust be
characterizedby, amongotherthings,a combination-eithera
balance or a particularratio-of noveltyand familiarity,
repetitionand variation,conformity
and disparity,
redundancyand information.
Learningis mostgraciouslyinvitedbya situationthat
appearsto some extentunknownbutthatpromisesknowability.
(Smith,OMD, 118)
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It is the testing of such patternsthat Thackeray's novels rehearse.
And so he blends the old vocabularies of his world with hypotheses
about how they relate to one another.
One of Thackeray's most direct discussions of this stitchingtogether of observation and inference occurs in an intrusionby Pendennis into his narrativeof the Newcome family.According to this
theory,the novelist "puts this and thattogether: fromthe footprint
finds the foot; fromthe foot,the brute who trod upon it" (Works,
8:491). The entire passage compares the novelist's job to the paleontologist's,describing the formeras one who, like ProfessorAgassiz, speculates froma "fragmentof a bone" (Works, 8:491). The
fragment,the historical evidence, in the novelist's case consists of
language, the vocabularies and conventions of culture, both past
and present. But much must be expanded upon, revised, and thus
discovered. Thackeray's blends of commentaryand action in his
narrativeswork like the scientist's hypothesis and experiment.The
narratorproposes something as happening, or as a past happening,
or even as a possible happening, and then interpretsit forus, proposing meanings forit and possibly even applying the meanings to
his readers' lives. Smith writes of our "epistemic fixation" (OMD,
117), our hunger for information,knowledge, and interpretations
forus in turnto interpret.Thackeray's narratorsenact thatprocessing. The delight is in watching this acute mind tracingthe patterns
and making us aware of our own tracings.
One of the most fruitfulplaces to go exploring forthis cognitive
activity is Chapter 64 of Vanity Fair, aptly labeled "A Vagabond
Chapter."20 As that title suggests, it seems indeed wandering, nomadic, as it follows the fortunesof Becky, the novel's irrepressible
vagabond, who straysever more afterRawdon leaves her. We catch
up with her in this chapter by followingher retreatto the Continent
and her subsequent ways of life. Filled with ambiguities and evasions about just what Becky does and does not do, how others do or
do not act towards her, and why they mightor mightnot have done
so, it resists our desire to rest frominterpretation.For every piece
of evidence of Becky's guilt there is an extenuatingcircumstance,a
sympatheticreading of the incident, or a complete displacement of
responsibility.Becky is depicted as more acted upon than acting in
her "abattement and degradation" (625). The snobbish Lady Slingstones who hound her are accompanied by such wolves as the lecherous Grinstone who "showed his teeth and laughed in her face
with a familiaritythat was not pleasant" (627). The point of view
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wanders in the chapter froma distanced perspective on "poor little
Becky" (627) to "our little wanderer's" (632) own thoughts,endearingly presented, at George Osborne's grave, until we are indirectly
given her genuine anxiety upon encountering Lord Steyne and
being rejected. Throughout the chapter, Thackeray has manipulated us throughvocabulary and point ofview to keep us offbalance
as to just how much we are to sympathize with Becky.
The chapter startsoffvery clearly with the distinction between
"the moral world" and "vice" (624), even though it teases us with
the distinction between appearance and reality in the elaborate
description of Becky as siren. The narratorobviously sets out to
satirize the "truly-refined English or American female" who
doesn't want vice represented. But in that complaint over censorship a comfortabledichotomybetween appearance and reality,and
moral and immoral, is itself set up forthe purpose of knocking it
down. Supposedly we have the decorous (unreal) world of novels
and the (real) world of vice, personified by Becky, in her role of
mermaid. But as we have seen, the rest of the chapter undermines-through its wavering point of view, conflictingscenes, and
ambiguous images-that very category of vice. Even the central
metaphor contributesto this collapsing of the dichotomy,though it
seems to supportthe absolute moralityofgood and bad, woman and
demon. The siren is supposedly half woman, half fish, and the
mocking opening paragraph warns us against following the creatures into "their native element," where they "are about no good,
... revelling and feastingon theirwretched pickled victims" (625).
But as we have seen, within two pages Becky is herself presented
as victim, subject to the teeth of other predators. The metaphor of
siren is retained, however, with very interestingresults. As she is
chased fromplace to place and made more and more lonely through
this persecution, she is presented as "perched upon the French
coast" (626); she shares "in sea-bathing" and takes walks "upon the
jetty" (627), attractstemporarycompanions with "the sweetness of
her singing" (629) and her "graces and fascinations" (630-31).
Thackeray has exploited a differentinterpretationof the siren figure as one of banishment and loneliness to put in question his own
earlier use of it. To discredit completely the alignment of his projected readers with good and the sirens with bad, he associates
Becky with Mrs. Hook Eagles, "a woman withouta blemish in her
character" who makes Becky's acquaintance "at sea, where they
were swimming together" (630). Thus the harpy and the siren be398
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come momentarilybosom companions (surely Thackeray is here
drawing fromthe alternative tradition of depicting sirens as half
bird, not fish),and the language not only of novels, but of morality
is criticized.
The chapter, then, is trulyvagabond, not only in its interest in
Becky's leading an unsettled, irregular,or disreputable life, but in
its own roving, straying,narration,its point of view seemingly not
subject to control or restraint.At its beginning we are presented
with a clear distinction between surface and depth, decorum and
vice; afterits explorations of those oppositions we are leftwith an
opaque verbal and narrativesurface, its depth (that is, the "truth"
about Becky) imperceptible. The play of the narrative, which is
dominated by speculative qualifiers like "perhaps" and "I don't
think" and "very likely," comes up with no definite answers to the
question of "her history[which] was afterall a mystery"(629), but
it does discover (and discredit) the conventions of a couple of language games. Throughout Thackeray's work we can find such play
with possible meanings, possible responses, and the possible
worlds which are implied by both.
There are several ramifications(for other narratives as well as
Thackeray's) of this use of fictionforcognitive play, one of which is
the improvisational form that such narratives employ. Part of
Thackeray's genius is his ability to develop his charactersand plots
as his narrativediscoveries change them. Thus, the narrator'sattitude toward Amelia Sedley develops as she does, fromadmiration
fora typical heroine (devoted and passive) to impatience with an
obsessive and manipulative woman. He can also suddenly find
some interestingqualities in Rawdon Crawley, afterhe (and we)
had him pegged as a stupid bully. The figure of the dandy can
signifyindependence (in ArthurPendennis) or utter dependence
on society (in the Major), depending on context.At the end of The
Newcomes, like Scott at the end of Old Mortality,Thackeray even
leaves the plot open-anticipating the "modern" phenomenon of
"open" texts-by suggesting thatthe picture we mighthave of the
hero and heroine married is only wishful thinking.He thus emphasizes both how readers participatein creatingthe novel by bringing
their common vocabulary of novelistic conventions to the text and
how his dissatisfactionwith conventional forms(of literatureand
knowledge) gives him a certaindaring independence with which to
play the game. Finally, in Henry Esmond, according to Ray, Thackeray's most planned novel, his hero's melancholy sense of change
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and nostalgia for the past (represented by the faithfulwoman,
Rachel Esmond) make one of the very subjects of the novel the
extentto which chance and improvisationmake up our (or at least,
according to this passage, men's) experience:
Whatis themeaningoffidelityin love,and whencethebirthof
it? 'Tis a stateofmindthatmen fallinto,and dependingon the
man ratherthanthe woman.We love being in love, that'sthe
truthon't.Ifwe had notmetJoan,we shouldhave metKate,and
adored her. We know our mistressesare no betterthan many
otherwomen,norno prettier,
norno wiser,norno wittier.'Tis
notforthesereasonswe love a woman,orforanyspecial quality
orcharmI knowof;we mightas well demandthata ladyshould
be the tallestwomanin the world,like the Shropshiregiantess,
beforewe
as thatshe shouldbe a paragonin anyothercharacter,
began to love her.(Works,7:272-73)
Another consequence of both Thackeray's role as ironistand his
use ofnarrativeforcognitive play is his understandingofthe ethical
importof fiction.Since he sees vocabularies not as pictures of the
world but as tools fordiscovery (and fordeception), and since he
reenacts in his fictionthe revisions we constantlymake, he is sensitive to the social conflictsthat occur when differingvocabularies
(complete with their differingvalues) meet.
VI. THACKERAY'S AESTHETIC

AND ETHICAL

PRAGMATISM

To say that it is impossible not to be sometimes a snob is to
acknowledge in a wonderfullyprovocative way how we must sometimes inscribe limits to irony even if we consider ourselves complete ironists.We must credit some uses of language at least some
of the time. We have to interpretourselves and others and texts,
even if we realize at the same time the inevitable limitations of
those readings; we cannot perpetually expect a better reading and
still functionin our social worlds. If the snob tries to play up his
claims and the claims of those he values to truth,the ironistworks
against this exclusivity,to subvert it in favorof a general leveling,
an understandingofthe contingencyofeveryvocabulary. Hence, as
Rortysays, the ironist,who questions the necessary existence of a
permanent moral order, has always seemed hostile to human solidarity (CIS, xv). This subversive enterprise is also the topic of
Harold Bloom's "agonistic" theory of literature and Thackeray's
declaration in The English Humourists: "Yesterday's preacher be400
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comes the text fortoday's sermon" (Works, 7:424).21 The recognition ofhis own snobbery,however, signifiesThackeray's awareness
that the ironic process does not go on forever in any individual
mind; the revolution (and semiosis) must come to a place of rest at
least fora while. It is in this conflictbetween the statusquo and the
radical (past meanings and the interpretiveimpulse, in the analogous termsfromhermeneutics) that literatureexists forThackeray.
Along with the ironist's subversiveness Thackeray displays his distrustofrevolutionaryzeal. Despite the implications of Barbara Har-

dy's excellentbook The Exposure of Luxury:Radical Themesin

Thackeray, I find him more a pragmatistthan a radical, at least
philosophically.22Realizing the contingencyof all vocabularies, he
was both bemused and deeply troubled by the competitiveness of
existence.
In the pair of dandies, Arthurand Major Pendennis, we see how
a cultural entitycould signifysomething valuable at one moment
and vain the next. This seemingly cavalier method of using the
figureto mean differentthingsin differentcontexts,what we might
call being the novelist-as-dandy,is anotherexample ofthe ironistin
Thackeray. He shows how circumstance helps determine meaning
and value by adding one significantvariable, age, to the club man,
the Major, therebychanging his significance. This role of the novelist-as-dandy captures the bubble-bursting, mocking function of
redescription.The young dandy stands as individual, independent
of the social conventions of familyand work,and, in the metaphors
of Thackeray's universe, as the figure of self-creation.His waistcoats and gloves are signs fromthis private vocabulary, which is
analogous to innumerable other such vocabularies we ourselves
form.But occurringwith regularityin Thackeray's discourse is the
competing public vocabulary of George Warrington,or the fogy,or
the preacher, whose earnestness quite frequently displaces the
puppet-master's irony. Both these vocabularies, which occasion a
doubleness itself an irony, are crucial for forming Thackeray's
sense of psychic struggles in individual selves, in the literature
they write and read, and in society. With such conflictingvoices as
part of his own make-up, Thackeray seems to appreciate how completely the self is formedby competing vocabularies. As his use of
the dandy indicates, he admires the ability (while also being wary
of it) of those who consciously re-create themselves (throughrecreation and play). The dandy has and exercises choice, though it is
a choice limited by the contingencies that have formedhis past.
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The voice of the preacher, on the other hand, employs the vocabulary not of self-creation,but of self-transcendence.When he
preaches vanity,the fogyis emphasizing the contingencyofthe self
created, and expressing the hope (at times seemingly vain in itself)
that there is something not subject to such contextual determination. As I pointed out at the beginning of this essay, Thackeray fails
eventually to find anythingimmune to devaluation and realizes it.
He finds that all of life cannot be held in a single language; its
contradictions demand compromise. At times, this realization invigorates him, while at others it defeats him.
This awareness of struggleinstills his theoryand practice of fiction with a slant toward ethical inquiry that is the final product of
his own inquiries. Since the snob uses language as a tool-or a
weapon, really-to exclude others,the exposure of the snob comes
about throughan ironic perspective on his language. But of course
the catch-22 is thatto call someone a snob is to be a snob, to use that
same language of exclusion against him. The result forThackeray is
that the examination of the languages of snobbery (of value) becomes a fixation,the only ethical role literaturecan play well. It
cannot, according to Thackeray's practice of it, safeguard us from
valueless enterprises and thoughts-to think that it can is to be a
literarysnob. The snob's comfortin judging others comes fromhis
abilityto hold thatperson offat a distance and therebyturnhim into
a thing for ridicule. The snob can voyeuristically enjoy the
"meanness" of others,as Mr. Snob enjoys the Ponto family.Thackeray's play is to turn the language of snobbery-which reifies the
other-reflexively back upon himselfand us. To objectifysomeone,
to suspend the rules of how to respond to, or "listen to" (in Smith's
words), a person, is to be a snob. Thackeray forces his readers to
examine theirlanguage and theiractions, to see how like the other's
they are. This inquiry into his society's (and our) ethical vocabularies is the main subject of the Thackerayan novel. To see how the
old preacher is turned into text by the next one, how the fatheris
revised by the son, is to see how we have arrivedwhere we are, and
where we will wind up when we in turnare redescribed. This sort
of epistemic activityis Thackeray's only ethical value fornarrative.
But, like Patricia Meyer Spacks, Thackeray also asks whether we
can ever have "narrative without ethics."23 And like her, he concludes that reading and writing fictions "heightens ethical selfconsciousness" (Spacks, 185). For Thackeray, fictional narratives
imitate not so much an outer reality,but the cognitive activityof
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human beings, the "texture of ethical life" (Spacks, 186; emphasis
added).
Smith describes the differentlanguage uses in society and literature (labelled as natural and fictive discourse) in terms of the
metaphors of linguistic marketplace and linguistic playground
(OMD, 119). In society language is a tool of exchange; we give and
receive real or bogus informationforimmediate practical ends. Literature is the playground where we can tryon vocabularies, see
how they are differentfromour old ones, see if they fit us, with
relatively few consequences (other than the knowledge of the nature of vocabularies gained in the process), because the rules governing reactions to linguistic acts are suspended in this "Fableland," to use Thackeray's name for it. The pair of metaphors encompasses both the competitive and playful sides of rhetorical
practice, and the satisfactionsof both. Thackeray's use of Bunyan's
place of business, Vanity Fair, in its turn,entails both of Smith's
terms.For a fairinvolves both the business of the marketplace and
the games of the playground,just as Thackeray's theoryand practice of fiction realizes both the hazards and satisfactions of existence in a world of competing descriptions.

University
of California,Los Angeles
NOTES
1 The Works of William Makepeace Thackeray, The Biographical Edition, 13 vols.
(New York and London: Harper & Brothers,1899), 1:488. Furtherreferences to this
edition will appear in the text.
2 Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1988). Furtherreferences will appear in the text,cited as CV.
3 For two examples of twentieth-century
impatience with Thackeray's sentiment,
see J.Y. T. Greig, Thackeray: A Reconsideration (London: Oxford Univ. Press,
1950) and John Carey, Thackeray: Prodigal Genius (London: Faber and Faber,
1977).
4

RichardRorty,Contingency,Irony,and Solidarity(Cambridge:Cambridge

Univ. Press, 1989), 23-26. Further references will appear in the text,cited as CIS.
5
Richard Rorty("Freud and Moral Reflection," Pragmatism's Freud, ed. Joseph
Smith and William Kerrigan [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986]) applies
this epithet to David Hume, a man whom Thackeray was both fascinated and disturbed by. In his review of Burton's biographyof Hume, Thackeray depicts the great
skeptic as two people, one publicly dangerous, the otherprivatelyquite personable.
See Contributions to the Morning Chronicle, ed. Gordon Ray (Urbana: Univ. of
Illinois Press, 1955), 113-117. Rortyalso indirectlyclaims Thackeray as a precursor
of Neopragmatismbecause he contributedto our "acquisition ofnew vocabularies of
moral reflection" by inventing "terms like ... a Becky Sharpe [sic]" (11).
6 Though these termsare hardly interchangeable, they all capture Rorty'ssense of
ironyas the realization thateach vocabulary we adopt is a convention,a made thing,
thatisn't necessarily betteror worse than any otherpossible vocabulary. I derive the

RobertP. Fletcher

This content downloaded from 144.26.117.20 on Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:29:15 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

403

terms from (respectively) William Empson, "Tom Jones," Kenyon Review 20
(Spring, 1958):218-19; Anne Mellor, English Romantic Irony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980); Wayne Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974); Kenneth Burke, "Four Master Tropes," A Grammar of Motives
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962); Robert Siegle, The Politics of Reflexiv-

ity:Narrativeand the ConstitutivePoeticsof Culture(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins
Univ. Press, 1986).
7

RichardPoirier,TheRenewalofLiterature:EmersonianReflections
(New York:

Random House, 1987), discusses Emerson and Wordsworthas pragmatists,while
Rorty(note 4) credits Nietzsche forfirstdoing philosophy froman ironic perspective, which has allowed for the thoroughgoing irony of Derrida. What all these
figureshave in common is the habit of talking of things not in "final" or metaphysical terms,but in figurative,that is rhetoricallyself-conscious, language.
8 Contrast,forinstance, his praise forthe caricaturistDaumier's topically dressed
figures (Works, 5:142-66) with his scorn for David's idealizing neoclassical work
(5:41-57), both in The Paris Sketchbook.
9 See From Cornhill to Grand Cairo, where in one paragraph on the Tomb of the
Sepulchre, Thackeray expresses both scorn forEnglish tourists'audacity and admiration forthe Anglican Church's simplicitycompared to thatof the Roman Catholic
(Works,5:694-95).
10Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1978). Further references will appear in the text,cited as OMD.

11JohnR. Searle, SpeechActs: An Essay in the Philosophyof Language (1969;

reprintCambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), 78.
12 Smith (note 10), 124-32, 210-11 n.7.
13 Robert Newsom, A Likely Story (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1988),
118-125.
14 Gregory Bateson, "A Theory of Play and Fantasy," Psychiatric Research Reports 2 (1955): 39-51; reprintedin Robert E. Innis, ed., Semiotics: An Introductory
Anthology (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1985), 129-44.
15The Lettersand PrivatePapersofWilliamMakepeaceThackeray,ed. Gordon
Ray, 4 vols. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), 1:432-33.
16 WilliamMakepeace Thackeray, The Memoirs of Barry Lyndon, Esq., ed. Andrew Sanders (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), 40. Further references to this
edition will appear in the text,cited as BL.
17 Gordon Ray, Thackeray, 2 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955). See 1:131-32
and 2:121-23, 367-69.
18 Poirier (note 7), 3.
19Alexander Welsh, Introduction to Thackeray: A Collection of Critical Essays
(Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 5; and "Theories of Science and Romance, 1870-1920," Victorian Studies (1973): 146.
20 This chapter has received several critical treatments,two of which I am particularly indebted to: Nina Auerbach, Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian
Myth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982) 89 and passim; and John Loofbourow, Thackeray and the Form of Fiction (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
1964), 60-66.
21

Harold Bloom,Agon: Towards a Theoryof Revisionism(New York:Oxford

Univ. Press, 1982).
22

BarbaraHardy,The ExposureofLuxury:Radical Themesin Thackeray(Lon-

don: Peter Owen Ltd., 1972).
23 Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Novel as Ethical Paradigm," Novel: A Forum on
Fiction 21.2/3 (1988): 184.

404

Thackeray and the Literary Pragmatist

This content downloaded from 144.26.117.20 on Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:29:15 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

